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ABSTRACT
 Transfer occurs when something is learned under particular circumstances and is 
applied in a new, somehow different, situation.  This paper will argue that fuzzy-trace 
theory can be used to explain the process of transfer.  The advantage of fuzzy-trace theory  
is found in a dual-process theory of memory.  Fuzzy-trace theory explains a broad range 
of phenomena and has the strength to conquer the elusive problem of transfer.   
 Trace-cue compatibility theory is a theory of memory retrieval.  By combining the 
trace-cue compatibility theory with fuzzy-trace theory, we get a method for treating both 
memory storage and memory retrieval.  This combination provides a powerful 
mechanism for understanding the results of classic experiments on transfer.  
 We can explain transfer in terms of particular forms of memory being cued by an 
event.  In many cases, the cued memory is an analog for the target item.  When the target 
analog has been mapped onto the appropriate memory trace, transfer can occur.
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1) Introduction
 The main goal of this thesis is to show that fuzzy-trace theory provides a 
framework for solving the elusive problem of transfer.  Transfer occurs when something 
is learned under particular circumstances and is applied in a new, somehow different, 
situation.  Fuzzy-trace theory is an empirically based psychological theory on human 
memory and learning.  It has been suggested that fuzzy-trace theory can be used to 
understand transfer.1  This thesis takes the work done by Wolfe, Reyna, and Brainerd, 
connects it to other psychological theories, and applies the resulting framework to the 
problem of transfer.  This approach will strengthen the argument that fuzzy-trace theory 
deserves a place in the mechanism of transfer.  
 We will combine the trace-cue compatibility theory with fuzzy-trace theory.  
Trace-cue compatibility theory covers memory retrieval.  This combination gives us a 
method for treating both memory storage and memory retrieval.  With help from trace-
cue compatibility theory and other research on analogies, fuzzy-trace theory provides a 
powerful mechanism for understanding the results of classic experiments on transfer. 
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2)What Is Fuzzy-Trace Theory?
 Fuzzy-trace theory is a psychological theory of memory.  Specifically, fuzzy-trace 
theory models the interaction between memory and higher order processes.1  It makes a 
number of claims that deviate sharply from traditional models.  We will now survey the 
specific claims made by this theory.
 Fuzzy-trace theory claims there are two independently functioning types of 
memory in the human mind.  These are called gist memory and verbatim memory.  This 
position is referred to as dual-process because of the two independent processes for 
memory.  One of the founders of fuzzy-trace theory described memory as being “of two 
minds - minds that are not well integrated with each other, neither when memories of 
experience are first stored nor when they are subsequently retrieved.”2  Empirical 
evidence supports the dual-process position and the evidence will reveal itself throughout 
this document.  
 Verbatim traces represent the superficial and particular characteristics of an item.  
Gist traces are representations of logical, linguistic, relational, and meaning-based 
information.3  Gist memory supports a fuzzy and intuitive form of reasoning.  Gist is the 
basis of pattern recognition.  Typically, the formation of generalizations and the ability to 
recognize similarity require the usage of gist traces.  Verbatim memory, on the other 
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hand, is about details.  Verbatim traces are rich in detail and tend to be context-specific.  
For example, suppose a person sees a computer.  Information about the shape, color, and 
size of the computer would normally be stored in verbatim memory.  Information about 
the general functions of the computer would be stored in gist memory.  
 One of the most distinctive tenets of this dual-process approach is that both forms 
of memory are stored in parallel.  They are, for the most part, stored simultaneously and 
processed independently.  Gist and verbatim retrieval are dissociated from one another.  
Verbatim traces are generally used for recall.  They store the surface features of a 
particular item that were directly observed during an event.1  Gist traces are generally 
used for reasoning and store interpretations of concepts formed about an event or an item.  
So while these two types of memory may be stored at the same time, they are typically 
retrieved separately depending on the task at hand.
 Another difference between gist and verbatim traces is their relative stability over 
time.  Verbatim traces are affected by retroactive interference.2  Retroactive interference 
often results in people remembering the details of an event differently than they were at 
the time the memory was formed (encoded).  This results in a faster rate of forgetting.  
For example, you remember that a person has green eyes.  If you subsequently observe 
several people with blue eyes, the green eye memory could now be stored (incorrectly) as 
a blue eye memory.
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 Surface details are typically not maintained in memory for extensive periods of 
time.  Verbatim memory is initially stored more readily because it represents the actual 
input data of the surface features of an experienced item.1  Gist memory requires 
additional processing and is therefore more difficult to store initially.2  The advantage to 
gist lies in being stored as a semantic form of memory.3  Semantic memory refers to 
meaning content and is maintained for longer periods of time.  Thus, there is a trade off 
between ease of storage and stability of storage.  An important consequence of the 
instability of verbatim memory is that it fades in time.  
 Gist memory accounts for the strength of human rationality.  The word ‘fuzzy’ 
hints at the detail deficient nature of gist traces.  As they age, people use more intuition 
and less surface detail for problem solving.  Children prefer to use quantitative reasoning.  
Older children and adults prefer a more qualitative method and have a ‘fuzzy-processing 
preference.’4  Fuzzy-processing is a synonym for gist-processing.  Despite being more 
intuitive, adults have greater accuracy in reasoning. Without so many verbatim details 
filling working memory, adults process information much more efficiently.  Difficult 
solutions to very abstract problems can result from this intuitive processing.  Precision 
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details are needed to solve some problems, but that seems to be the exception.  It is the 
patterns of inputs that are needed for rationality, not their verbatim forms.1  
 From here on, we will focus on applications and connections to other theories.  
Fuzzy-trace theory fits well with other prominent psychological research.  The first 
section connects fuzzy-trace to a theory of memory retrieval.  The next section applies 
fuzzy-trace theory to the problem of transfer.  The final section contrasts fuzzy-trace 
theory with traditional accounts of transfer experiments.
3) Memory Storage And Retrieval
 Encoding-retrieval match occurs when a cue is similar to a memory.  For 
example, a piano might remind you of what you know about playing music.  The 
standard encoding-retrieval view would explain this by appealing to the fact that the cue 
and the memory are very similar.2  Although this is a plausible view, it has limitations.  
The trace-cue compatibility theory places the emphasis elsewhere with better results.
 Nairne has argued that memory-cue similarity may correlate with, but does not 
cause a match.  He describes remembering as a discrimination process.  The cues in a 
situation act as criteria for accessing the relevant memory.  The primary inhibitory effect 
is ‘cue overload.’  Cue overload occurs when a cue has been associated with multiple 
memory traces.  When this occurs, the cue is unable to identify the specific trace that is 
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relevant.1  A particular cue could be highly similar to a particular memory trace, but if it 
is associated with many other memories, a match will be difficult.  Furthermore, a cue 
could be dissimilar to a memory but still match if they have been related in some way.  
Nairne suggests using ‘relative match’ as opposed to a simple similarity-based match.  
Relative match is how much a cue uniquely specifies an event.2  The cue may or may not 
be similar to the event that it matches.  For example, you see a car and it somehow brings 
a chimpanzee to mind.  This kind of match is certainly possible but it could not be 
explained based on similarity.  The car might uniquely specify the chimp for a reason 
other than similarity.
 Fuzzy-trace theory claims that verbatim and gist memories can be formed in 
parallel at the same time.  The two memory traces will therefore be very similar and a cue 
could easily match both memories.  Yet, verbatim access is favored when retrieval cues 
match the surface content of a target memory.  Gist access is favored when the cue 
matches the meaning content of a target memory.3  This is where relative match comes in 
handy.  Verbatim representations contain surface content, so they will have the greatest 
relative match to cues for surface content.  Gist representations contain meaning content, 
so they will have the greatest relative match to cues for meaning content.  Being similar 
to the cue might be related to a particular memory being accessed, but only because 
having the greatest relative match uniquely specifies the appropriate memory trace.
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 Nairne conducted an experiment where subjects were provided one unique cue, 
two unique cues, or one shared and one unique cue for a target.1  Although adding a 
second cue increased the similarity between the cue and target, the extra cue actually 
decreased success rates for recall tasks when it was a shared cue.  If the extra cue did not 
uniquely specify a target, it reduced performance in comparison to a single unique cue.  
Not surprisingly, subjects given two unique cues performed best on recall tasks.  When 
the similarity between cue and target increases, recall performance tends to also increase.  
However, the similarity is not causing the improved performance.  In some cases, 
increasing the similarity decreases recall performance.  Cues that uniquely specify the 
correct memory enable correct responses, not the degree of similarity between the cue 
and trace.2
 Trace-cue compatibility is a theory of memory retrieval.  Fuzzy-trace is a theory 
of memory storage and function.  Fuzzy-trace research has resulted in some data about 
cues.  These results are supportive of Nairne’s account of trace-cue compatibility.  When 
these two theories are combined, we get the backbone of a complete theory of memory 
storage and retrieval.
 It was important to quickly establish the relationship between cues and traces.  We 
will now switch gears to discuss the main topic of this thesis.  The paper will now focus 
on the application of fuzzy-trace theory to the problem of transfer.
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4) A Close Look At Transfer
 Transfer occurs when a concept or skill is learned in one situation and is then 
applied to a new, somehow different, situation.  If pressed, we could find twenty or so 
definitions and descriptions of transfer.1  A successful theory of transfer has been difficult 
to find but we continue looking because it is an important area of educational psychology.  
Corporations are interested in training people for work.  Schools are interested in 
teaching students in classrooms.  People are expected to take what they learn in seminars 
or classrooms and apply this knowledge to a variety of situations.  Researchers hope to 
find an underlying mechanism of transfer.
 Historically, there have been many takes on transfer.  We will look closely at two 
that stand out.  One position claims that transfer is essentially not possible.  The other 
position claims that transfer requires a huge ‘knowledge base.’  After looking at these two 
possibilities, we will contrast these views with an explanation provided by fuzzy-trace 
theory.  Wolfe, Reyna, and Brainerd have previously applied fuzzy-trace theory to the 
problem of transfer2.  We will combine fuzzy-trace theory with the trace-cue 
compatibility theory.  If successful, this approach will give us a better mechanism for 
understanding transfer.  We will use this method for evaluating the traditional theories of 
transfer.
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4.1) Is Transfer Extremely Limited?
 In the introduction to Douglas Detterman’s critique of transfer research, he makes 
a bold claim: “if people seldom transfer skills and if they cannot be taught to transfer, 
then transfer can have no importance as an explanation of individual differences in 
everyday behavior.”1  Detterman believes that transfer rarely occurs.  His claim goes to 
the heart of the transfer debate and it should be evaluated.  First, seldom transfer is not 
the same thing as no transfer at all.  Secondly, Detterman does not show convincingly 
that people cannot be taught to transfer.  We will call Detterman’s position the extremely 
limited theory (ELT for short) because this theory claims that transfer is extremely 
limited.
 Detterman typically is focused on ‘general transfer.’  General transfer occurs 
when a generalized skill or concept is applied across varied situations.  This is the 
strongest form of transfer that researchers take seriously.  Historically, there have been 
numerous studies claiming to demonstrate evidence for general transfer.  
 Judd showed that subjects could transfer an understanding of refraction to the task 
of hitting underwater targets.  Young boys who were taught the principles of refraction 
were able to transfer these principles to hitting targets at various depths under water.  For 
a more complete description of this experiment, see section 5.2 of this paper.  The 
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important thing here is that the students were told that refraction was applicable to the 
underwater target task.  Detterman dismisses Judd’s experiments as demonstrating that 
subjects can follow instructions.1  In another case, young children were taught the skill of 
stacking.  They applied this principle to solve several different problems.  Detterman sees 
this as rule induction and not as transfer.  However, it isn’t clear from his objection that 
rule induction is unrelated to transfer.  Detterman concludes that most transfer studies 
either explicitly tell the subjects about an analogous solution or use a “trick” to cause 
them to notice that a solution they already know may apply to the current problem.2  
ELT’s first major conclusion is that people rarely transfer skills or concepts from one 
situation to another.  Therefore, transfer is not a big factor in describing human behavior. 
 ELT’s second major conclusion stems from the claim that transfer is an 
“epiphenomenon.”3  It can be safely assumed that the phenomenon of transfer consists of 
more basic processes.  These underlying processes theoretically represent the direct 
causal factors in human behavior.  In that sense, transfer will not provide any 
fundamental explanations.  The second conclusion avoids the problem of transfer by 
suggesting we study learning in a more fundamental way.  If transfer is merely a 
byproduct of other processes, Detterman suggests we should focus our attention on these 
lower level processes.




 We could apply this epiphenomenon argument to most of the topics in the field of 
psychology.  This would put us on a continual search for more basic processes.  We 
would eventually discuss neurotransmitters and that conversation would not explain 
human ability either.  For example, Parkinson’s disease has been linked to the lack of a 
specific neurotransmitter (dopamine) in the mid brain.1  An understanding of the basic 
processes does not contain all the information about Parkinson’s disease.  The symptoms 
of Parkinson’s disease are an effect of the deficiency of dopamine in certain processes in 
the brain.  The symptoms are nevertheless important to understand for the sake of 
diagnosing the condition.  The higher order symptoms should be studied along with the 
fundamental processes.  
 Returning to transfer, the epiphenomenon argument does not settle the issue at 
hand.  If the process of transfer consists of more basic processes, we can’t be certain there 
are no important details at other levels of description.  Furthermore, while it is plausible 
that psychological theories might contain ever more fundamental explanations leading 
down to the physics of psychology, we cannot be certain of this.  If we are uncertain that 
psychology can be reduced in this way, we should not expect our psychological theories 
to reduce.  Jerry Fodor has argued we can use science to study the world without 
appealing to fundamental laws.2  By demanding that our theories contain fundamental 
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explanations, we could exclude the very thing we are trying to explain.  So let’s return to 
ELT’s claim that transfer is not important in human behavior. 
 If people can transfer a skill or concept to a new situation by simply instructing 
them to do so, this supports the view that transfer is teachable and suggests that transfer 
could be common.  By telling subjects that previously learned concepts are applicable to 
a new situation, they were given a cue to consider certain concepts stored in memory.  To 
understand any new pattern, problem, analogy, metaphor, relation, or inference, we would 
always expect people to have some sort of cue to recall prior memories.  Whether this cue 
originates in the subject, the experimenter, or the external environment is of little 
consequence to the process of transfer.  The content of the cue is important, not the 
origin.  We should not expect people to spontaneously transfer concepts any more than 
we should expect them to self-generate cues for the retrieval of memory representations 
perfectly suited to the task at hand.  So let’s proceed with the assumption that people 
might be good at transfer when provided the correct memory cues.
 For memory retrieval, experienced items are better retrieval cues for verbatim 
traces than non-experienced items.  Non-experienced items that comprise the meaning 
content of an experience are better retrieval cues for gist traces.1  Transfer falls under the 
second category.  The skill of transfer does not involve experiencing the same item we 
have seen before and remembering something about it.  Transfer involves experiencing 
something new that has an analogous meaning to an event we have experienced before.   
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When subjects are told to apply a previously learned skill to a new situation, this does not 
cue the retrieval of verbatim memory.  Instructions to apply prior knowledge to a new 
situation will cue gist memory.  Gist memory alone can provide the underlying meaning 
needed for transfer.  Without clear retrieval cues, the subjects could have retrieved 
unhelpful verbatim traces or have been confused by the dissimilar surface features 
between the prior and current situations.  For example, a stool looks and feels differently 
than a couch, but they are both used for sitting.  A person who has never seen a couch 
might not know its purpose.  If someone tells them to apply what they know about stools 
to the couch, they might see the underlying analogy.  It would be difficult to achieve this 
based on comparing the surface details of the two seats.
 ELT has not made a strong case against transfer.  Fuzzy-trace theory has shown 
some promise for explaining when and why transfer is possible.  Before going further 
with this approach, we will consider the work of Haskell and his view of transfer.
4.2) Does Transfer Require a Huge Knowledge Base?
 Robert Haskell claims, “the essential problem in transfer is when and how 
something is perceived as being the same as or equivalent to something else.”1  He 
believes the solution to this problem lies in having a huge knowledge base.  Knowledge 
base is defined by Haskell as the quantity and organization of the knowledge possessed 
by a person.  Knowledge is acquired in many ways such as reading, experience, listening, 
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observing, and thinking.  Haskell claims that a large knowledge base is “the absolute 
requirement not only for transfer but for thinking and reasoning.”1  For example, expert 
chess players don’t have superior brains; they simply know more about chess.  Since 
knowledge is stored in memory, we can assume that Haskell is suggesting that people 
need a huge number of memories, organized in the right way, to support transfer of skill.  
From here on, I will refer to this as the HKB argument.
 The HKB position further contends a large knowledge base also improves our 
pattern recognition ability.2  To notice a regularity between two situations, people require 
a large number of organized memories.  The more memory we have about various 
situations, the more likely we are to notice similarities between them.  
 The next big claim of the HKB argument concerns the storage of memory.  The 
claim is that people with a large knowledge base retrieve memories and transfer 
knowledge better than people with less knowledge.3  The knowledge base results in 
superior memory function, not the other way around.  Once again, Haskell supports this 
claim by pointing out that chess experts have no better memory ability than chess 
novices; they simply know more about chess.
 In summary, the HKB argument suggests that a large knowledge base will result 
in (1) an increased ability to perceive analogies, (2) superior memory encoding and 
retrieval, and (3) the ability to transfer as a result of (1) and (2).




 To evaluate claim (1), we need a theory of analogies.  Fortunately, a clear and 
general explanation of analogies already exists.  A relevant analog must be retrieved from 
memory.  This analog must be compared to the target and similarities must be identified.    
This process is known as ‘mapping.’  The target is mapped onto a familiar analog.  This 
allows analogical inferences to be made about the target and often results in new 
knowledge.1
 Thus, it is not a large number of memories that is needed, but relevant memories.  
It is very plausible that a large number of memories will increase the chances that a 
person will have the relevant memories for a particular analogy.  This new claim would 
need to be empirically tested.  Nevertheless, HKB seems compatible with the findings 
from analogy research.
 Claim 2 is not supported by fuzzy-trace theory.  This research has shown that 
precise memories do not correlate with accurate reasoning.2  Even if a large knowledge 
base results in superior encoding, this does not provide a mechanism for transfer.  Precise 
encoding is not needed for gist reasoning and is therefore not needed for transfer.  A large 
knowledge base full of detail rich memories could actually hurt reasoning.  Memory-to-
reasoning interference occurs when surface features cue verbatim memories in a situation 
where gist memory is needed.  Interference affects children more frequently than adults.  
When children are provided the background inputs for a reasoning problem, they have a 
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tendency to only consider how the inputs bear on solving the problem.  This inhibits their 
abilities when the problem involves transfer because background inputs do not contain 
inferences.  Without further cues, this results in low performance.3  The following 
paragraph will explain this in more detail.
 Transfer is a reasoning task.  Research has shown that reasoning ability is largely 
independent of storing a great deal of memory.2  In one experiment, children were told a 
short story about the number of various animals a farmer owns.3  Remembering the actual 
numerical values was not correlated with being able to correctly answer reasoning 
questions.  Suppose the children were told “Farmer Brown has 2 pigs, 3 ducks, and 4 
chickens.”  When later asked if there are more pigs or chickens, the correctness of their 
response was independent of whether the children could remember how many of each 
animal there are.  The child may have inferred something relational about these 
background inputs and stored this in gist memory.  Thus, reasoning tasks only require a 
relatively small amount of gist knowledge.  Correctly answering reasoning questions does 
not rely on the encoding of precise verbatim memory.
 Accurate reasoning does not require the storage of huge amounts of knowledge.  
HKB could be reformulated to suggest that people with a large number of gist memories 
are good at a broad number of reasoning tasks.  However, it is not the large amount of 
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knowledge that is needed.  Transferring a skill requires a limited number of gist 
memories well suited for that particular task.  The amount of other memories is irrelevant 
to a particular transfer task and in some cases could hurt transfer by causing interference.  
HKB would need to show that having a large knowledge base results in having relevant 
gist memories for transfer and that these effects are not negated by interference.  An 
alternate possibility is that as we age, people acquire a larger knowledge base and more 
gist memories for reasoning/transfer.  Gist memory would be correlated with a large 
knowledge base, but not be caused by it.  
 Fuzzy-trace theory suggests that gist memory for reasoning can exist 
independently of the knowledge base size.  Of course, adding these gist traces will 
increase the knowledge base to some extent.  The point here is that a large knowledge 
base will do nothing for your ability to transfer unless it contains useful gist memory.  It 
is the gist memory that explains transfer, not the large knowledge base.
4.3) Fuzzy-Trace Theory’s Take on Transfer
 The key to transfer is not getting distracted by simple surface details of the 
problem.  To apply the same lesson across multiple problems, people must compare 
underlying similarity.1  This takes place using gist reasoning.  
Massey, M. Ryan, 2007, UMSL, p. 21
1 Wolfe, Christopher R., Valerie F. Reyna, and Charles J. Brainerd.  “Fuzzy-Trace Theory: Implications in 
Teaching and Learning.”  In Transfer of Learning From a Modern Multidisciplinary Perspective, edited by 
Jose P. Mestre.  Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing (2005), 59.
 Contrary to Detterman’s claim, we can teach people to transfer.  In order to teach 
transfer, teachers must emphasize gist reasoning and find ways to cue gist memories 
under appropriate conditions.  Experiments have supported the views of fuzzy-trace 
theory.  For example, consider a study on learning geologic time scales.1  Participants 
were split into groups.  One group was asked to study geologic time lines using a rote 
memory strategy.  Another group was asked to generate analogies for the time line.  This 
could play out in many different ways.  For example, when magma cools it becomes 
rock.  Analogously, when water cools it becomes ice.  A student could use this analogy to 
remember that magma was present on the surface of the Earth before the current state of 
rock.  The analogy group was better at placing the events on a time line.  The rote 
memory group was more accurate in matching an age to a given event.  This study 
provided evidence that rote memory improves verbatim memory and that analogical 
reasoning improves gist memory.  Increases in one did not correlate with increases in the 
other.  Gist and verbatim traces are independent.  Subjects that were good at the time line 
task were typically not good at the recall task and vice versa.  
 In light of the preceding sections, we may conclude that transfer depends on how 
well we learn gist and how well it is cued.  Gist is needed for transfer because it enables 
us to see the underlying similarity between contexts in spite of dissimilar surface 
features.2  Surface features can confuse a person or cue unhelpful verbatim 
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representations.  Under these conditions, transfer will not be possible.  If, on the other 
hand, a person has been trained to link surface cues to the appropriate gist memories, 
transfer will be possible.  
 The previous section has dealt with contemporary theories used to explain 
transfer.  We will now look at more traditional views.  
5) A Fuzzy Take on Two Classic Experiments
 Many classic experiments on learning have been analyzed in terms of the 
abstractness or concreteness of the knowledge.  Edward Thorndike claimed that two 
situations must have concrete identical elements between them for transfer to occur.  
Charles Judd claimed that people can transfer on the basis of abstract generalizations.  In 
this section, we will look at the traditional understanding of these experiments and try to 
shed new light with fuzzy-trace theory.
5.1) Rethinking Identical Elements
 Edward Thorndike conducted a long series of psychology experiments in the early 
twentieth century.  In one example, subjects were asked to estimate the area of various 
rectangles.  The subjects were taught to do this by using comparison rectangles with 
given areas.  Even with over 1,000 trials of training, errors remained very high.  After 
some increases in skill with rectangles, subjects were unable to transfer this ability to 
estimate the area of other shapes like circles or triangles.  Thorndike found “no 
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relationship between how well subjects did on one square and how well they did on the 
next.”1
 Thorndike’s conclusion is simple.  Transfer is very difficult to achieve.  These 
experiments supported the conclusion that transfer requires a set of ‘concrete identical 
elements’ between two situations or events.2  Simply put, for someone to learn something 
in one situation and apply it to a new situation, there must be at least some part or parts of 
the new situation that exactly replicate the initial conditions.  In 1901 terms, when a 
person is stimulated by an identical concrete element, they respond by applying a learned 
skill.
 There are reasons to look elsewhere for a theory of transfer.  These concrete 
identical elements do not seem to capture all transfer events.  For example, learning 
mathematics and applying it to science.  It isn’t clear how Thorndike would explain this.  
Furthermore, in his rectangle experiment, there were concrete identical elements between 
the rectangles and subjects still failed to transfer.  Thorndike’s results demonstrate 
something about human learning, but not how people succeed at transfer.
 The fuzzy-trace theory tells a different story.  Repeating the same training trial 
over and over is a rote memory strategy.  Contemporary evidence suggests rote 
memorization results in strong verbatim representations.  Just as importantly, rote 
memorization also leads to weaker gist representations.3  Verbatim traces are cued by 




surface content while gist traces are cued by meaning content.1  As previously noted, 
analogical reasoning requires gist memory.  To transfer a skill, an analog from memory 
must be mapped to the transfer target.2
 Thorndike trained his subjects in a way that developed strong verbatim 
representations.  These representations are great when you are trying to remember very 
specific information in a context-specific way.  However, the training inhibited the 
subjects from forming gist representations.  Rote memory did not allow subjects to form 
the kind of analogies needed for gist memory.  When properly cued, these memories 
could have helped the subjects notice the analogy between the shapes they learned and 
the areas they were asked to estimate.  Thorndike chose to focus on the concrete features 
of the learning conditions and the transfer conditions.  He noticed that his subjects were 
not using any abstract reasoning and their only successes occurred by using concrete 
representations.  Fuzzy-trace theory can explain why subjects typically failed to transfer 
and it makes a prediction.  
 If the participants were taught analogies relating the two situations and were cued 
to use those analogies, they would have succeeded.  Specifically, if participants were 
cued to use the rectangle area memories that are also relevant to finding circle areas, they 
would have been demonstrating transfer.  Analogies help people notice when one 
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memory is useful in more than one application.  Verbatim traces inhibit this process by 
obscuring the bigger picture.
5.2) Rethinking Abstract Generalizations
 In 1908, Charles Judd provided an experiment, that seriously challenged 
Thorndike’s theory.  The results suggest that transfer can occur by way of an underlying 
abstract general principle.1  Judd asked young boys to throw darts at underwater targets.  
He then split them into two groups and they performed indistinguishably during the first 
trial.  Initially, the targets were twelve inches under water.  One group was provided 
additional training.  They were told how light is refracted by water and that this 
information might be useful for hitting targets.2  When the depth was changed to four 
inches and later to eight inches, the refraction group quickly adjusted.  By understanding 
refraction, these boys were able to perform effectively in a new situation.3  The control 
group learned by practice only.  The boys without an understanding of refraction 
struggled anew each time the depth changed.  
 Judd concluded that the group with refraction training was able to generalize a 
principle and apply it to a new situation.  Simply put, these boys used an abstract 
understanding to solve a problem.  Framed in this way, the conclusion raises many 
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questions and is controversial.  Just as Thorndike compared two situations based on 
concrete elements, Judd compared two situations on the basis of underlying abstract 
similarity.  Thorndike’s view is that if there are enough concrete similarities, transfer of 
skill can occur.  Judd’s view is that if there are enough abstract similarities, transfer of 
skill can occur.  This has caused a long-standing and seemingly irresolvable debate.  How 
similar do the situations need to be?  Is abstract transfer different than concrete transfer?  
Do people actually use both types of understandings to solve problems?  Is one more 
important in problem solving?  Did Thorndike actually show that transfer is limited?  Did 
Judd actually show that transfer is possible?  And so on.
 Just as fuzzy-trace theory gave us a clearer picture of Thorndike’s research, it can 
also help us with Judd.  For the boys hitting targets under water, it might not have been 
obvious to them that a lesson on refraction had anything to do with their task.  At first 
glance, light bending in water and darts moving through water to hit a target may seem 
unrelated.  However, the boys were able to apply what they had learned to the problem.  
 Both groups discovered that hitting targets underwater is challenging.  Only the 
group with an understanding of refraction understood why it is challenging.  Based on 
their training, the boys learned the underlying meaning of the problem and they were 
encouraged to notice the relationship between refraction and target-hitting problems 
involving various depths of water.  This is an example where “intuitive, fuzzy, gist-based 
thinking facilitates bridging across contexts that differ in verbatim detail.”1  The boys 
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were trained in a way that created gist representations in memory.  In order to cue these 
representations, the boys were told that they would be useful to the problem of hitting 
under water targets.  The boys formed gist representations, they were properly cued, and 
they used gist reasoning to solve a problem by connecting two seemingly unrelated 
concepts.
5.3) Concluding Remarks
 Fuzzy-trace theory has given us something new to think about.  Analyzing the 
concrete elements did not provide a complete picture of transfer.  Judd’s abstract 
generalizations did not provide a mechanism in support of his theory.  Fuzzy-trace theory 
gives us a plausible mechanism that explains the results of these classic transfer 
experiments
6) General Conclusions
 Fuzzy-trace theory explains a broad range of phenomena.  It has the strength to 
conquer the elusive problem of transfer and provides a mechanism for understanding 
some classic experiments in psychology.  Its strength is found in a dual-process theory of 
memory.  Gist and verbatim traces provide a critical element for understanding human 
rationality.  We can understand transfer in terms of gist and verbatim traces being cued by  
an event.  In many cases, the cued memory is an analog for the target item.  When the 
target analog has been mapped onto the appropriate gist or verbatim trace, transfer can 
occur.
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